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Corrupt Reciprocity – an Experiment 
 




We let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of 
the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of public servants chose 
between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a 
contract) and those acting as businesspeople chose how to frame the 
game and whether to blow the whistle. While opportunism and 
abstaining from whistleblowing is the Nash equilibrium, another 
likely outcome was that businesspeople allocate resources to 
punishing public servants for non-delivery, exhibiting a preference 
for negative reciprocity. Anticipating this, public servants might tend 
to reciprocate or blow the whistle upfront. Female public servants 
were more inclined to behave opportunistically; female 
businesspeople were less engaged in negative reciprocity. This 
corroborates a favorable role of women in anticorruption. 
Businesspeople who strongly preferred a corrupt framing of the game 
and obtained a form with corrupt wording were more willing to 
punish non-delivering public servants. This operates against 
camouflaging a bribe as a gift, because gifts fail to signal negative 
reciprocity.  
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Keywords: Corruption, ultimatum game, whistleblowing, gender, signaling, trust 
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1 Introduction 
At a recent trial in Munich, Germany, Holger Pfahls has been charged with accepting bribes 
during his time as state secretary for defense under former Chancellor Helmut Kohl from 
1989 to 1992. He is accused of accepting the equivalent of almost €2 million ($2.6 million) 
from German-Canadian businessman Karlheinz Schreiber to push through a deal to deliver 
36 Fuchs armored vehicles to Saudi Arabia. In court Mr Pfahls is quoted as giving  the 
following description of the alleged briber (own translation): “Schreiber told me that I was 
just one out of many who receives bribes. When Schreiber hates someone, his hatred is so 
profound that he wants to destroy him, even if that involves his own demise. On the other 
hand, he is a real buddy, highly talented in creating a pleasant atmosphere.”
1 This concise 
description of a briber, hinting at several variants of reciprocity, is at the heart of this paper. 
Partners in a corrupt transaction may cheat each other. They may renege on their promises or 
report to prosecutors or superiors before or after a deal has been finalized. Corrupt actors 
operate outside the law and, if they feel that they are  being treated unfairly by their corrupt 
counterpart, cannot refer to the law’s protection. This suggests that private ordering is 
standard in corrupt transactions. Betrayal among corrupt partners is a good thing from the 
point of view of society at large. It ensures that corruption is a troublesome business and 
induces potential participants to refrain from getting involved in corrupt arrangements. Given 
that private ordering tends to be imperfect, the risk of opportunism and leakage of 
information to prosecutors emerges as a key deterrent against individual involvement in 
corrupt transactions, (della Porta and Vanucci 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91-110; 
Lambsdorff 2002; Lambsdorff, Schramm and Taube 2005; Ogilvie 2004; Kingston 2007). 
This approach has recently gained attention in the literature, providing avenues for reform, 
(Lambsdorff 2007). The uncertainties surrounding corrupt transactions and the doubtful 
enforcement of such agreements can be amplified by designing criminal sanctions in a 
strategic way, aimed at enhancing opportunism. Lambsdorff and Nell (2007) make 
suggestions for criminal codes, based on a game theoretic framework. 
Acts of opportunism and (self-) reporting are not uncommon. In fact, insiders are often a vital 
source of information for the prosecuting authorities, (Anderson 1995; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 
53). For those who decide to expose a deal there are various motivations. Monetary 
inducements by prosecutors or the media may render whistleblowing a profitable strategy. 
However, such instances seem to be the exception. Mostly, whistleblowers face retribution 
and sometimes a miserable life. Altruism and a sense for public interests may contribute. On 
the other hand, a less altruistic motive may contribute: negative reciprocity. Actors who were 
cheated by corrupt counterparts may retaliate by blowing the whistle. This would be a less 
favorable type of whistleblowing that has received little attention in the literature. This is at 
the core of our game, which is motivated in more detail in section 3, following the literature 
overview in the next section. Section 4 presents our hypotheses, section 5 gives details of our 
experimental design and data. Section 6 presents our findings. To what extent these findings 
may relate to behavior outside the laboratory is discussed in section 7. 
                                                 
1   Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 21, 2007, “Holgart und andere ‘dumme Tarnnamen’” (italics ours).    2    
2  Previous experimental literature 
That opportunism represents a substantial threat to informal contracting has recently been 
corroborated by laboratory experiments. These experiments build on regular (non-corrupt) 
games of reciprocity. Drawing on the gift-exchange literature, Abbink et al (2000) let two 
participants hope for reciprocity when exchanging gifts. In case of defection, one of them can 
spend resources on punishment. Game theory would predict that such punishment would not 
be carried out because it does not increase the punisher’s income. Expecting that sanctions 
will not be imposed, the other player would have no incentive to return a gift. This suggests 
that none of the participants would hand out gifts in the first place. However, contrary to 
game-theoretical predictions, retribution is found to be quite common. Hostile actions tend to 
be punished (negative reciprocity) while the friendly ones are rewarded (positive 
reciprocity). Even when this runs counter to payoff maximization, players do bad to those 
who did them bad and good to those who did them good.  
Experimental investigations on corruption represent a rather novel area of research, see 
Abbink (2006), Andvig (2005) and Dušek et al (2004) for reviews. In one of the first 
investigations, Frank and Schulze (2000) focused on individual tendencies to engage in 
corruption in procurement and whether economists are more likely to accept bribes. In a later 
contribution, Schulze and Frank (2003) extended their analysis to state how intrinsic 
motivations are affected by threats of penalties.  
Subsequent studies focused on the interaction between businesspersons and public servants. 
One starting point for modeling interaction is the classical ultimatum game. For a review of 
experimental findings on ultimatum games see Camerer (2003: 48-83). In these games a first 
mover can propose a division of a cake and a second mover can accept or reject, inducing a 
zero-payoff for both. Preferences for fairness and reciprocity motivate players to deviate 
from the payoff-maximizing Nash equilibrium. A second mover may reject, either because 
he dislikes inequality or because of negative reciprocity, that is, the willingness to retaliate. 
First movers may share fairly with second movers, either because they anticipate the second 
mover’s willingness to reject or because they themselves dislike inequality.  
While preferences for fairness and reciprocity operate hand in hand in regular ultimatum 
games, they are conflicting in corruption games. Reciprocity is a force that induces players to 
share with each other, even involving the allotment of illegal earnings. This is no longer the 
case for fairness, which may also involve sentiments of civic-mindedness and altruism. It 
may go along with preferences for sharing with third parties. Corrupt actions are known to be 
unfair to the population at large, inducing fair actors to refrain from participating. This 
suggests that a corrupt framing of an ultimatum game may impact on the outcome. 
Slightly different from corruption experiments based on the ultimatum game are those that 
are essentially trust (or gift-exchange) games. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) design a 
game where players can jointly profit by exhibiting trust and sending money to each other. 
Every time money changes hands the payoffs to third players are reduced, resembling the 
negative externality of corruption. The authors find no effect of the size of this externality on 
the way the game is played. The corrupt externality thus seems to have no impact. Abbink 
(2004) extends this game to investigate the effect of staff rotation. Jacquemet (2005) shows 
that a third party (a principal) can lower the willingness to engage in corruption by 
deliberately choosing a higher wage for the agent. Unfortunately, his investigation disregards 
the enforcement problem between briber and public servant, thus pushing aside the risk of 
opportunistic bribe taking.     3    
Camerer (2003: 87) speculates that cross-country differences in levels of trust might be 
related to a country’s overall level of corruption. This idea is picked up by Cameron et al 
(2005) who investigate a game where a third party that suffers from corrupt externalities can 
devote resources to punish corrupt firms and public servants. The authors find differences 
between treatments with locals in India, Indonesia, Australia and Singapore. But these 
differences do not correlate with these countries’ perceived levels of corruption. The finding 
suggests that more analysis is needed and that country-specific differences in overall levels 
of corruption cannot easily be traced to differences in individual attitudes.  
3 Experimental  design 
We extend previous laboratory experiments in various respects. We embed a gift-exchange 
game in a corrupt context with negative externalities. For this purpose we utilize a simple 
mini-ultimatum-game with only three pre-determined alternative choices for the public 
servant (blow the whistle, behave opportunistically, reciprocate). This simple structure 
allowed us to focus our attention on questions as to who might be more willing to reciprocate 
and who may prefer opportunism. The businessperson acted as a responder with the 
opportunity to blow the whistle (nullify the corrupt deal) or stay quiet. A formal treatment of 
the game can be found in Lambsdorff and Nell (2007).  
Some games tend to use neutral language in order to avoid suggesting the ‘right’ answer. But 
it was criticized that such approaches might ‘neutralize away’ important aspects of behavior, 
(Abbink 2006: 425). In reality public servants will operate in a context where the behavior is 
morally loaded, thus it appears reasonable to replicate such descriptions experimentally. This 
is done by Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002), who use morally loaded terms that relate to 
corruption in the (rather complicated) instructions of a game, but find no impact on the 
results. We extend this analysis by endogenizing the choice of the frame. Businesspeople 
were allowed to choose between a corrupt instruction and a less offensive instruction, where 
gifts were exchanged with a public servant without explicit requests for reciprocity (gift-
framing). Thus, there is an endogenous determination of the frame, which allows an 
investigation of how behavior in the game is related to the choice of the frame. The less 
offensive frame emulates the fact that in reality a briber may camouflage a bribe as a gift. We 
expected our participants to strictly prefer this camouflaged version, but were surprised by a 
considerable number of our participants.  
In our game, the public servant takes the role of a proposer by deciding whether to allocate a 
contract to the briber or to behave opportunistically. The businessperson responds by staying 
calm or blowing the whistle, resulting in both players receiving nothing.  
The main difference between a standard ultimatum game or gift exchange game and any 
reasonable corruption experiment is that in the latter case, "successful" bilateral negotiations 
should impose an externality on a third party. Abbink et al. (2002) designed this externality 
as a certain amount subtracted from the payoff of all other participants in the experiment who 
played the same game at the same time. However, a kind of reciprocity might be an issue 
here: If a subject expects other participants to opt for the corrupt action, this might provoke, 
or justify, his or her decision to do the same.  
This possible effect is avoided if the externality is imposed on parties not involved at all  in 
the experiment. This corresponds better with real cases of corruption, where bribers and 
officials do harm to people who will never get the chance to pay them out in their own coin.    4    
In our case, the third party is Médecins Sans Frontières, a well-known non-profit 
organization, the donation to which would depend on the subjects' behavior.
2  
4 Hypotheses 
For the ultimatum game and its variants, relying on the subgame perfect equilibrium leads to 
notoriously bad predictions of outcomes. Hence, in order to formulate our hypotheses, and to 
calibrate our experiment, we had rather to observe what happened in related experiments. 
Most important for us is a mini-ultimatum game suggested by Falk et al. (2003). In one 
version of their game, a proposer can offer either (8, 2) or (2, 8) with the first figure denoting 
the proposer’s payoff and the second figure denoting the responder’s payoff. The authors 
observe that 73% of proposers chose (8, 2), the rest proposed the outcome that is less 
favorable to themselves, (2, 8). 26.7% of responders rejected when they were confronted 
with (8, 2). Thus while a "80 percent for me"-offer may fail to maximize the proposer's 
expected profits in a normal ultimatum game, that might be different if only a limited set of 
actions is available to the proposer.
3 In this respect, our game is similar to the mini-
ultimatum game invented by Falk et al. (2003),
4 hence we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 1a: Some business people punish opportunistic behavior instead of maximizing 
their payoff. 
Hypothesis 1b: Some public servants deliver (reciprocate), either because they fear negative 
reciprocity or because they prefer to do those good who did them good.  
Hypothesis 1c: On average opportunistic behavior - i.e., taking the bribe but not helping the 
briber - will be payoff maximizing.  
Some evidence, both from the field and from the laboratory, has already been found for a 
different inclination of women and men to engage in corrupt behavior. In our setup, this 
would mean: 
Hypothesis 2a: Female “public servants” are more likely to blow the whistle. 
Hypothesis 2b: Female “public servants” are less likely than male agents to reciprocate. 
Hypothesis 2c: Female "businesspeople" are more likely to report on bribe-taking. 
Offering a gift instead of a monetary bribe might be considered as desirable, as the moral 
connotations are possibly less negative. We did expect this all the more as our subjects did 
not have a choice whether to offer something or not; even the most scrupulous ones could 
only choose between offering a gift and a bribe and should opt for the gift as the morally less 
                                                 
2   As mentioned above, Jacquemet (2005) designs his experiment with a more explicit principal-agent 
relationship where the official harms another player, his principal, when taking bribes. 
3   In three other treatments (that were also played by all players) different alternative outcomes, i.e. (5, 
5), (10, 0) and (8, 2), could be proposed instead of the (2, 8) mentioned above. 
4   Our game differs from the one by Falk et al because our subjects played only once. We felt that this 
might reduce rejection rates because players cannot hope to recap their lost payoff elsewhere. We intentionally 
increased the attractiveness of reciprocity on corrupt promises by doubling the players payoff relative to the 
payoff in case of opportunism. But this was offset by promising a donation to a charity as long as the 
businessperson would not obtain the contract. Apparently, these changes disallow a comparison of our results to 
those by Falk et al. (2003). Still, our guess was that our results should be fairly similar to theirs.    5    
controversial alternative. Furthermore, those indifferent to possible moral connotations 
between the two framings might still expect the agent not to be indifferent. 
Hypothesis 3a: The gift framing is preferred by “businesspeople”. 
Hypothesis 3b: The gift framing leads to a lower amount of whistleblowing by “public 
servants”. 
While these were our a-priori hypotheses, more hypotheses and results were produced in the 
course of our investigation. These will be explained subsequently. 
5  Details of the corruption experiment and data  
Participants taking the businesspeople's part in the experiment were recruited at the Clausthal 
University of Technology, from lectures in introductory economics (first year students of 
business economics and engineering economics) and microeconomics (second or third year 
students of business economics and engineering economics). The experiment took part in the 
classrooms (or rather lecture halls), but participation was voluntary - students knew the 
experiment would take place and be played anonymously, hence they could easily stay away. 
Altogether, 192 students took part in the first round of the experiment, 12 of them were 
excluded from the data set due to incompleteness of the questionnaires or a mistake in a 
control question.  
The completed forms were then sent to Passau University, where participants took the role of 
the public servants. 176 students were recruited for this purpose from a course in 
macroeconomics (third year students of business administration and economics as well as 
governance and public policy). Four forms from the 180 received from Clausthal were left 
over and filled out by the instructors. The completed forms were then sent back to Clausthal, 
where 152 of the valid 180 first round participants showed up to play round three. 
Afterwards, 25 forms (i.e. 50 participants) were randomly chosen, and participants could get 
their payments either in Clausthal or Passau from a secretary in a separate room, their 
decisions remaining hidden from the other participants and from the experimenters. 
The round 1 participants in Clausthal received four sheets (see Appendix): The third and 
fourth were two forms, identical apart from the framing. Either of the words “bribe” or “gift” 
was used and in the former case there was an explicit request to award the contract in 
exchange for the bribe. On the second sheet, personal data such as nationality and gender 
were asked for, and participants could bid to secure their preferred framing, instead of a 
random assignment with a 50 percent probability for each framing. The first sheet contained 
the main instructions. 
During round 1, in each of the two lectures in Clausthal 12 "rights to choose the preferred 
framing" were auctioned in a simple multi-unit Vickrey auction (which gets complicated 
when participants can bid for more than one unit; that was not the case here.) This method 
implied that the price of a preferred frame was determined by the 13
th highest bid, the first 
one that remained unsuccessful. To introduce participants to the Vickrey auction, the 
sessions started with the second-price sealed-bid auctioning of a CD, which we used to 
demonstrate the incentive compatibility of the mechanism. 
Participants were placed at an appropriate distance from one another and communication 
between them was not allowed as long as they had the forms. The first round was short and 
consisted of     6    
-  deciding between framings 
-  bidding for a framing (zero bid or no bids were allowed, however) 
-  indicating nationality, gender and a nickname plus two-digit code number, ensuring 
anonymous payment. 
All participants in Clausthal and in Passau were shown figure 1, revealing the payoffs 
that were identical for both framings. Starting from an endowment of €25, the 
businessperson gives €20  (as a gift or bribe) to the public servant, resulting in an initial 
endowment of €5. He or she would win a further €35 as a profit from the contract in case 
of reciprocity and lose €5 if someone blows the whistle. The public servant obtains a 
payoff of €20 (gift or bribe) from the businessperson. He would have to pass on €10 for 
arranging the awarding of the contract (reciprocity). Upfront whistleblowing induces 
confiscation of the gift or bribe but a bonus of €2. If the contract is not given to the 
businessperson in Clausthal (either due to opportunism or whistleblowing) no damage is 
imposed, resulting in a €8 donation to Medecins sans Frontiers.  
Figure 1: The game in extensive form.  
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In Clausthal, the experiment lasted about an hour. The hourly earnings for those who were 
drawn and paid was about €18 including a €10 show-up fee.  
At Passau University the sheets (either bribe or gift) were distributed in a sealed envelope 
among the participating students. The rules of the game were explained in neutral wording 
and no hint was given that two alternative forms would be distributed. Envelopes were then 
opened and the game was played. On a second sheet, personal data such as nationality and 
gender was asked for. The game in Passau lasted 30 minutes. 
6 Results 
6.1  Approaching the agent  
In our experiment, firms did not have the option to refrain completely from making a transfer 
to the agent. Their chance to display anti-corrupt behavior was, however, only postponed. 
The only choice they had to make in the first stage of the experiment was how to approach 
the agent. Table 1 shows participants' preferences for the two framings. If participants voiced 
no preference for any of the framings each of them was assigned with a 50 percent 
probability. A bid that was sufficiently high would secure a framing with certainty, thus 
increasing the probability by 50 percent. 
We expected our participants to prefer the form where an exchange is described as a gift 
rather than the more offensive version where the payment was described as a bribe. 
However, we felt that the more direct request for reciprocity in the corrupt form may also be 
considered to be advantageous by players in the role of businesspeople. Indeed, we observed 
that some businesspeople preferred the corrupt framing and were willing to place substantial 
bids to obtain this form, table 1.  
 
Table 1: Gender and preference for gifts or bribes 
 
  Women bidding for 
corrupt framing 
Women 
bidding zero  
Women bidding 
for gift framing  
Number of bids  12  27   29 
average bid  1.85  0  3.49 
median bid  1.83  0  3.00 
Playing with 
corrupt/gift framing 
6/6 16/11  15/14 
 




Men bidding for 
gift framing 
Number of bids  27  40  45 
average bid  4.62  0  4.48 
median bid  4.57  0  3.02 
Playing with 
corrupt/gift framing 
24/3 21/19  11/34 
 
Women and men appear not to be different with respect to their preferences for the framings. 
Taking both sexes together, 22 percent expressed willingness to pay (WTP) for the corrupt 
framing, 41 percent for the gift framing, and 37 percent did not show a preference for one of    8    
the framings that would have translated into a positive bid. However, among those who bid 
for a corrupt framing, men have a significantly higher WTP than women (at a 1 percent level 
of significance using a Mann-Whitney-U-test). With hindsight, those who bid zero had a 
correct guess of the true difference in the value of the framings, as will be shown in the next 
section.  
The number of bribe framings handed out is slightly higher than the number of gift framings. 
This was a purely random effect, because only few sheets were tendered while the rest was 
assigned with a 50% probability.  
6.2  The public servant reacts  
49 participants out of 176 in Passau preferred to blow the whistle upfront.
5 This appears to be 
a strong framing effect. Whistleblowing might already be motivated by the externality (the 
donation). However, the high degree of whistleblowing cannot be explained by the 
externality alone. Students in Passau may have a preference for donating €8 to Médecins 
Sans Frontières. Still, whistleblowing is dominated by both alternatives. To reciprocate (i.e., 
deliver) allows the prospect of obtaining €10. Donating €8 and keeping €2 would replicate 
the outcome of the whistleblower. In addition, reciprocating retains the liberty to donate 
more or less. Choosing the opportunistic action would even provide the prospect of 
collecting €20 and donating even more. While these considerations suggest the existence of a 
framing-effect, we contend that a fully-fledged proof requires a control experiment with 
neutral wording. 
There is no direct framing effect in the sense that the choice of the framing would have a 
significant impact on the agents' decision making, table 2.   
Table 2: Public servants response to different frames 
   framing 
   gift  bribe 
Fishers’ exact probability 
test (one-sided): 
Probability of distribution 
within row not being 
different to rest of matrix 
whistle  24 (29%)  25 (27%)  0.45 
opportunism  48 (58%)  53 (57%)  0.52  Public servant's 
reaction  reciprocate  11 (13%)  15 (16%)  0.37 
    83 (100%)  93 (100%)   
 
We observe a considerable number of public servants reciprocating the bribe, alongside our 
hypothesis 1b. Apart from that, we cannot find evidence in favor of hypothesis 3b, i.e. less 
whistleblowing in case of gifts as opposed to bribes. Overall, we do not find differences in 
how the two forms were dealt with by the public servants in Passau. There was neither more 
whistleblowing on the corrupt form, nor was there more reciprocity. Overall, the choice of 
the frame remained without an impact on the public servant. This failure may also relate to 
the little emphasis given in Passau to differences in framing. The payoffs were explained to 
students without mentioning that two alternative forms existed. Given this lack of 
knowledge, they also could not recognize that the form was explicitly chosen by 
                                                 
5   As mentioned before, 4 sheets were filled out by the instructor. These are of course not counted here.     9    
businessmen in Clausthal. This lack of emphasis is a likely reason why the forms that were 
so important to students in Clausthal were accorded little attention in Passau. We purposely 
did not mention differences explicitly to avoid overshadowing the written forms by morally 
loaded explanations of the game. In future research this restriction may be relaxed to observe 
whether public servants react differently to gifts or bribes. 
There were remarkable differences in gender, as revealed in table 3. For statistical analysis 
we use Fisher’s exact probability test. In a 2x2-matrix this test determines the probability that 
both columns follow a joint distribution (the null hypothesis), where differences arise only 
randomly. Fisher’s test would then determine the likelihood that the observed or even more 
unequal results arise at random. Low values thus indicate a low probability that the 
observations randomly emerged under the constraints of the null hypothesis.  
Table 3: Gender matters; public servant’s reaction 
    public servant's gender 
   male  female 
Fishers’ exact probability 
test (one-sided): 
Probability of distribution 
within row not being 
different to rest of matrix 
whistle  19 (24%)  29 (30%)  0.23 
opportunism  39 (49%)  62 (65%)  0.03  Public servant's 
reaction  reciprocate  21 (27%)  5 (5%)  0.00 
    79 (100%)  96 (100%)   
As shown in table 3, women are only insignificantly more likely to blow the whistle. 
Comparing the 29 whistleblowing women (out of 96) with the 19 whistleblowing men (out of 
79) we observe a Fisher's exact probability of 0.23 (one-sided). We are thus not able to 
confirm hypothesis 2a. However, at a 5-percent error level women are markedly more likely 
to behave opportunistically.
6 65% of them keep the bribe without doing for the briber what 
she or he hopes for, in contrast to 49% of the male participants. More drastically, 27% of the 
men, but only 5% of the women reciprocate. This is strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 
2c.  
While women are sometimes found and sometimes not found to be more cooperative than 
men in laboratory experiments, here they appear to be significantly less cooperative, but the 
situation is special since it is a briber, a corrupt person, with whom they very likely decline to 
cooperate. Yet this does not necessarily mean that women's moral predisposition is different, 
it might simply be strategic considerations: If women do not expect negative reciprocity 
among businesspeople they might guess that opportunism is the most profitable strategy. We 
will turn to this in the next section. 
 
6.3 Costly  punishment  by  the disappointed bribee? 
As shown in table 4, there is considerable deviation from payoff-maximization, as suggested 
in hypothesis 1a. Furthermore, men are much more likely than women to punish 
                                                 
6   Replicating the design of Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002), but focusing on gender effects, Rivas 
(2006, p.14-15) found a similar result.    10   
opportunistic behavior.
7 This is strong evidence against hypothesis 2c. Our presumption that 
female businesspeople tend to blow the whistle has been misguided. One explanation for the 
contrary finding may relate to feelings of negative reciprocity being felt more by men and 
that these male feelings less require a common good as a motivating cause. If the subjects 
presume that the average participant in the game is no different from themselves in this 
respect, this might have been a reason for male agents to refrain from opportunistic behavior 
with a higher likelihood than female agents. 
Table 4: Punishment of opportunistic behavior, by gender 
   businessperson’s  gender 
   Male  female 
whistle (punish)  16 (31%)  5 (16%)  businessperson’s reaction 
to opportunistic behavior  not whistle  35 (69%)  27 (84%) 
    51 (100%)  32 (100%) 
Fisher's exact probability test: p = 0.087 (one-sided) 
Nevertheless, even if all firms' decisions had been made by men, opportunistic behavior 
would have led to a higher expected payoff than to deliver. While "deliver" leads to a sure 
payoff of 10, opportunistic behavior leads to a payoff of 20 if successful, the probability of 
success being 35/51=0.69 and the expected payoff being 13.73 in the case of male firm 
decision makers. This supports hypothesis 1c.  
The chosen framing was important to the businesspeople in Clausthal when deciding on 
whether to blow the whistle. Those choosing the corrupt form in Clausthal were more wiling 
to punish non-delivery, see table 5 .
8 A straightforward interpretation is that the corrupt form 
was chosen in order to signal negative reciprocity. The terms “bribe” and the request to 
deliver the contract were preferred as a signal that nonconforming behavior would be 
punished. The illegal nature of the corrupt form signals the players that “honor among 
thieves” necessitates private ordering of conflict. Even if punishment is costly, once signals 
of honor are delivered they may dominate payoff maximization. While this threat was 
certainly not subgame perfect for payoff-maximizing players it was played nonetheless, and 
more often by those with the corrupt framing. We did not hypothesize this behavior upfront 
because it came as a surprise to us, albeit one that makes much sense in retrospect.  
Might this finding be explained by gender, that is, male bribers retaliating and female gift-
givers not blowing the whistle? We are not aware of a standard test to answer this question 
and made use of a bootstrap-approach. Such an approach yields results that converge (with 
higher repetitions) towards the Fisher coefficient for all of the above tests and promises equal 
validity here. As reported in table 5, 2 women and 10 men were determined bribers. We 
randomly drew 2 women from the total sample of 32 women and noted how many of these 
blew the whistle, the likelihood being 16% according to table 4. Likewise we drew 10 men 
out of the total sample of 51, their likelihood of blowing the whistle being 31%. If a total of 6 
or more from these two draws blow the whistle, we replicated our finding as a purely random 
result without determined bribers actually exhibiting a different behavior, which is our null. 
                                                 
7   Punishment that is costly not to the briber, but to a third party ("citizen"), is featured in a corruption 
experiment by Cameron et al. (2006). 
8   As the actual price for receiving the money bribe framing for sure was higher than 1 euro, a small 
number of participants bid more than 1 euro and played with the gift framing. Including them in the group of 
"determined money bribers" slightly reduces the level of significance, but does not change the results 
qualitatively.    11   
We ran 100000 repetitions of this algorithm and observed 6 or more whistleblowers only in 
7.6%. This allows us to reject the null at the 10-percent error level. Thus, determined bribers 
are more likely to retaliate. 
Table 5: Punishment of opportunistic behavior, by preference for framing 
    type of businessperson 
    determined briber*   gift-giver or indifferent  
whistle (punish) 6 (50%)     [5, 1]  15 (21%)     [11, 4]  businessperson’s 
reaction to 
opprtunistism  
not whistle  6 (50%)     [5, 1]  56 (79%)     [30, 26] 
    12 (100%)  71 (100%) 
*A determined briber plays with the bribe frame and bid at least 1 € for this frame. 
Details on gender [male, female] in brackets 
Fisher's exact probability test: p = 0.044 (one-sided). 
We checked whether this interpretation of the choice of frames was also intended by our 
players by distributing questionnaires at the end of the game in Clausthal. The choice of gifts 
was mostly motivated because the milder wording might less offend public servants in 
Passau, but also because businesspeople in Clausthal felt that they were acting less 
illegitimately themselves. Others mentioned a less apparent quid-pro-quo of gifts that 
appeared preferable to them. The choice of the bribery form was sometimes explained by the 
better fungibility of monetary payments as opposed to the in-kind character of gifts. Also, the 
game was considered to be better described as a game of bribes rather than gifts, the bribe-
form thus having the advantage of clarity. Bribers also seemed to be risk-loving and curious 
about the public servant’s reaction. Finally, in line with our results, we observed players 
preferring the bribery form because it entails a clearer quid-pro-quo and, even because the 
illegality may help avoid opportunism.  
7  Policy implications and conclusion  
Whether our results can be swiftly applied to the world outside the laboratory/classroom is a 
challenging question. Some participants may have felt that whistleblowing is the behavior 
expected from the lecturers due to their reputation of being engaged in anticorruption. The 
framing effect described above would then be related to such sentiments by students. 
Although we feel that university lectures are not considered to indoctrinate but to sharpen our 
thinking we contend that this argument is hard to dismiss outright.  
A bigger concern may relate to stakes and repetition. Stakes in real corrupt transactions are 
much higher. List and Levitt (2007) cite evidence, although mixed, that in ultimatum games 
higher stakes bring outcomes closer to the Nash. This would indicate that opportunism is 
even a bigger risk in reality. On the other hand, some chance of repetition is commonly given 
in reality and it was ruled out in our game. However, participants in laboratories are 
sometimes suspected of playing as if repetition were possible, contrary to explicit 
instructions (List and Levitt 2007). The relevance of opportunism is also confirmed in a 
recent field study by Maréchal and Thöni (2007). They found that gifts given by sales 
representatives to business people result in higher sales revenues, but only if buyers and 
sellers are not interacting for the first time. Hence, overall we have little reason to assume 
that opportunism in one-shot interaction is less or more likely in reality.  
A final concern might be that our results are valid only for sophomore students but not for 
practitioners. In July 2007 we also played the game at a summer school with 40 senior    12   
prosecutors and fraud investigators from various continents and found results that are much 
along the lines of those reported here. While the sample was rather small, in discussion we 
also detected similar patterns of reasoning, confirming our overall findings. 
Overall, we observe two different approaches to bribing public servants. While transferring a 
"gift" is preferred because it appears less offensive and demanding, a bribe is chosen 
precisely for the opposite reason: it is more demanding and clearer that reciprocity is 
expected, including the threat to retaliate in case of opportunistic behavior. We found 
empirical evidence on these differences.  
Gender matters crucially in corrupt exchange. Although women have often been found to be 
less likely to engage in corruption, we did not find that women were more likely to blow the 
whistle. Instead, they were significantly engaged in opportunism, bribe taking without 
reciprocity. Men tend to engage in positive reciprocity, delivering to the briber, even if this 
behavior is at odds with moral considerations vis-à-vis society. Men were also more willing 
to play negative reciprocity: They more often blew the whistle when their bribe was not 
reciprocated. Reform should thus focus on a better involvement of women in the public and 
the private sector. Future research may deepen these insights by investigating group behavior 
and whether (and how many) female participants in teams would make a difference.  
Given the high incentives for opportunism, corrupt actors in reality are desperate to find 
mechanisms to enforce their deal. This explains why one-shot games are rather seldom in 
reality and why repetition is so urgently needed for corrupt transactions. The more frequent 
repetition of corrupt transactions and the less opportunism is a natural reaction of the corrupt 
marketplace. The observation of repetition in reality does not contradict our paper, it rather 
supports our finding by pointing to the severe problems with enforcement in one-shot 
interaction. 
Our experiment helps to sharpen our view on conditions that make one-shot corrupt contracts 
"enforceable" and on how to enhance opportunism. Clearly, as theoretically suggested by 
Lambsdorff and Nell (2005) as well as Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2005), whistleblowing may 
increase corruption rather than decreasing it when it is motivated by negative reciprocity 
rather than integrity. Reform must focus on improving incentives for the “good” 
whistleblowers (those who act upfront or after having completed a corrupt transaction) but on 
deterring the “bad” whistleblowers (who threaten to retaliate after being cheated).   
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Appendix: Instructions and forms 
 
 (slightly abridged) 
 
Cover sheets of instructions for all participants in Clausthal ("businesspeople") 
Many thanks for participating in this experiment, which runs roughly as follows: You send a 
message to a student in Passau. You will not know who exactly that person is, and vice versa. 
After having received your message, your opponent makes one decision. Then both of you 
get paid, the amount depending on your final decision.  
The game will be played only once. There are two variants, which do not differ in possible 
payments, but in the wording of your message. 
[Some technical advice on choosing an alias and code number for claiming the payoffs, and 
on entering personal data, omitted]  
 
Second page: 
   -  Carefully read form A and form B. Decide for yourself with which form you would 
prefer to play. 
   -  A random mechanism will determine whether you actually play with form A or form 
B.  
   -  However, you have the chance to get one form for sure. 12 forms of every kind will 
be auctioned off; you will be asked to submit your bid. Most likely the price you have 
to pay will not equal your bid; the 12 participants with the highest bids will play with 
their favoured forms and pay a price that equals the 13th highest bid. If  less than 13 
bids for one forms are made, the price of that form is 0. 
(control question omitted) 
If you could, which form would you choose? 
   Form A (gift for the agent) 
   Form B (bribe for the agent) 
What is your bid for the rights to choose the preferred form, instead of receiving one 
randomly? 
€__,__  
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Third page: 
Sheet A 
[Section to be filled out by agent:] 
I am the public servant responsible for the awarding of the public contract.  
Firm Alpha gave me a gift worth €20. Firm Beta, a competitor of Alpha, could carry out the 
contract better. If Beta got the contract, the general public would benefit to the tune of €8. 
That benefit is paid to Médecins sans Frontieres by the experimenters. 
I decide to take the following action (please mark with a cross): 
Action 1  I report the acceptance of the gift to my agency. Though 
I may not keep the gift, I receive a €2 bonus. Firm Alpha 
has to pay a €5 penalty. 
  
Action 2  I keep the gift, but I do not favor firm Alpha. Rather, I 
award the contract to the better firm Beta. 
  
Action 3  I keep the gift and I give a part of it (€10) to my 
colleagues to ensure that firm Alpha really is awarded the 
contract. Firm Alpha then makes a profit of €35. 
  
 
[Section to be filled out by firm:] 
I am the owner of firm Alpha. From my initial endowment of €25 I used €20 to purchase a 
gift for a public servant. The public servant was responsible for awarding the contract that I 
was interested in. Now I see (on the upper half of the sheet) how the public servant dealt with 
the gift. I cannot react to Action 1. In response to Action 2 or 3 I decide to take the following 
action (please mark with a cross): 
do nothing    
blow the whistle    
If I decide to “blow the whistle” this means that I report to the government agency that I paid 
a gift to the public servant. If I was awarded the contract, the contract would then be revoked. 
In any case I have to pay a €5 penalty. The gift is retained by the agency. 
If I decide to “do nothing” I get 
  - nothing if the public servant took Action 1  
  - €5 if the public servant took Action 2  
  - €40 if the public servant took Action 3 
[end of instructions] 
Note that a figure similar to figure 1 was also shown to the participants.    17   
In Sheet B on the fourth and final page of the instructions (corrupt framing), the wording was 
changed as follows:  
gift → bribe;  
purchase a gift → pay a bribe and in return requested me to award the contract;  
report the gift to my agency → report the bribe to the public attorney;  
the gift is retained by the agency → the bribe will be confiscated 
... 